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Lifeline Electric Rates: Are They
Unreasonably Discriminatory?
I. Introduction
Average electric utility rates for residential consumers rose fifty-
four percent between 1969 and 1975.' Moreover, average bills of
residential consumers increased ninety-one percent during this pe-
riod of heightened electrical consumption.2 One survey shows that
between December of 1976 and March of 1978 the nation's twenty-
four largest electric utilities implemented rate increases averaging
nineteen percent.3 These increases place a particularly heavy burden
on the poor and those who live on low fixed incomes, most notably
the elderly.4
To alleviate the impact of rising rates, concerned groups have
advanced a controversial group of proposals known as "lifeline" util-
ity rates.' Lifeline rates are designed to ensure that residential cus-
tomers receive a minimum supply of electricity basic to a normal
human existence at a price affordable by the poor and the elderly.6
The rate structures designed to attain this goal differ, however, with
respect to the criteria that identify groups eligible for low rates.
The two lifeline proposals that are most often discussed charge
1. Samuelson, Battle Lines are Being Generatedfor Reform of Electric Utility Rates, 8
NAT'L J. 1474 (1976).
2. Id
3. Electric Rates Keep Climbing, BUSINESS WEEK at 183 (May 22, 1978) (average in-
cludes a wide spread of increases, ranging from 77% for Union Electric Co. in Missouri to 0.9%
for Consumers Power Co. in Michigan).
4. Rate Concessions to Poor Persons and Senior Citizens, 14 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR)
87, 88 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1976).
5. See, e.g., Re Potomac Elec. Power Co., 84 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 250, 255 (D.C.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970); Re Kan. Power and Light Co., 20 Pub. U. Rep. 4th (PUR) 55, 63
(Kan. State Corp. Comm'n 1977); Re Public Serv. Co. of N.H., 95 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 401,
448 (N.H. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1972); Re Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 85 Pub. U. Rep. 3d
(PUR) 276, 296 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970); Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Philadel-
phia Elec. Co., 91 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 321, 372 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1971).
6. See, e.g., Re Potomac Elec. Power Co., 84 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 250, 255 (D.C.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970); Re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 95 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 401, 448
(N.H. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1972); Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 91
PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 321, 372 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1971). See generally NAT'L CON-
SUMER INFORMATION CENTER, HANDBOOK FOR CONSUMER ADOCATES: ELECTRIC UTILITY
RATE PROCEEDINGS (July 1976) (Testimony of Joe D. Pace, Before the Pub. Serv. Comm'n of
N.Y.) [hereinafter cited as Testimony of Joe D. Pace].
preferred rates on the basis of the customer's ability to pay7 or
charge low rates for a certain minimum level of consumption.8 A
third type, not commonly recognized as a lifeline rate, consists of an
adjustment made to a rate structure based on Long-Run Incremental
Cost pricing theory (LRIC). This type reduces rates to the classes of
customers whose demands would change least in response to a de-
crease in rates-presumably the poor.9
In the past, lifeline proposals have been defeated by those who
maintain that such rates are "unreasonably discriminatory" '-that
the basis for differentiating between preferred and non-preferred
customer classes is "unreasonable."' " Recently, however, the stan-
dard of reasonableness in Pennsylvania has been construed liberally,
which has led the Public Utility Commission (PUC) to approve and
implement the low level consumption rate.' 2 The commonwealth
court' 3 has affirmed the PUC order and the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has denied a Petition for Allowance of Appeal.'4 This com-
ment examines the justifications advanced for the three lifeline rates
to determine their compatibility with the evolving Pennsylvania
standard of reasonableness.
II. The Standard of Reasonableness for Rate Structures in
Pennsylvania
All rates charged by public utilities in Pennsylvania are subject
to the approval of the Public Utility Commission.15 Public utilities
7. See notes 38-40 and accompanying text infra.
8. See notes 75-80 and accompanying text infra.
9. See notes 91-95 and accompanying text infra.
10. See, e.g., note 5, supra.
11. See, e.g., Re Kansas Power and Light Co., 20 PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 55, 63 (Kan.
State Corp. Comm'n 1977); Re Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 85 (Pub. U. Rep. 3d (PUR)
276, 296 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970); Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Philadelphia
Elec. Co., 91 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 321, 372 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1971).
12. See notes 143-150 and accompanying text infra.
13. United States Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util Comm'n, 37 Pa. Commw. Ct.
173, 390 A.2d 865 (1978).
14. United States Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, allocalur deniedper
curiam, Pa. Supreme Court Allocatur Docket Nos. 1749, 1752 (Dec. 14, 1978).
15. 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1301 (Purdon 1978) (all utility rates shall be just and
seasonable); 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 501-502 (Purdon 1979) (granting the PUC authority
to enforce the provisions of the Public Utility Code).
Ratemaking in regulated industries is not based upon the traditional principles of free
market economics. In the theoretical free market economy, and to varying degrees in certain
sectors of the modem unregulated economy, no one economic unit has the power to influence
the price of a commodity. Many producers exist, each of whose maximum production is too
small to influence the price of the product. The uncontrollable forces of supply and demand
determine prices.
In the utility industries, however, monopolies of production are the rule. Without govern-
ment regulation, the utility monopolists could restrict production and charge unfairly high
rates. Consequently, the regulatory commissions fix or approve patterns of rates designed to
balance the needs of the utilities' shareholders for a fair rate of return on their investments
with the needs of'consumers for adequate utility service at reasonable prices. See generally I.
BARNES, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILrrY REOULATION 1-22,42-60 (1942); J. BONBRIGHT,
are permitted to earn revenues sufficient to recover their operating
expenses and to provide an additional "fair rate of return"' 6 on their
rate base.'7 The PUC first determines the amount of this revenue
requirement 8 and then approves a pattern of rates, known as the
rate structure,' 9 to be charged by each utility to particular classes of
customers-residential, commercial, and industrial.
Since each customer class is charged a different rate, all rate
structures are necessarily discriminatory. Only "unreasonable" dis-
crimination is forbidden, however.20 The Pennsylvania Public Util-
ity Law provides that:
[n]o public utility shall, as to rates, make or grant any unreasona-
ble preference or advantage to any person, corporation, or munic-
ipal corporation, or subject any person, corporation, or municipal
corporation to any unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage. No
public utility shall establish or maintain any unreasonable differ-
ences as to rates, either as between localities or as between classes
of service . . . . Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to
prohibit the establishment of reasonable zone or group systems, or
classifications of rates .... 21
The issue whether a rate structure represents a reasonable basis
upon which to discriminate among the rates charged to various cus-
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 3-65 (1961); M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, PUBLIC UTIL-
TIES: REGULATION, MANAGEMENT, AND OWNERSHIP 1-78 (1973); C. PHILLIPS, JR., THE Eco-
NOMICS OF REGULATION 3-121 (1965); H. TRACHSEL, PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 3-69
(1947).
16. For a discussion of the "fair rate of return," see I. BARNES, supra note 15, at 516-64;
J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 15, at 147-283; M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, supra note 15, at 222-29;
C. PHILLIPS, JR., supra note 15, at 261-303; H. TRACHSEL, supra note 15, at 322-40.
17. Generally the rate base is the value (net of depreciation) of the utility's plant that is
devoted to the production and distribution of the service provided. Items included in the rate
base for an electric company are generation and transmission facilities, and other equipment
used to provide the service. See generally, I. BARNES, supra note 15, at 370-515; J. BONBRIGHT,
supra note 15, at 159-237; M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, supra note 15, at 79-93; C. PHILLIPS, JR.,
supra note 15, at 214-60; H. TRACHSEL, supra note 15, at 235-321.
18. The revenue requirement is determined according to the following equation:
R = 0 + (V-D)r
in which
R is the total revenue required,
0 is the operating costs,
v is the gross value of the tangible and intangible property,
D is the accrued depreciation of the tangible and reproducible property, and
r is the rate of return.
C. PHILLIPS, supra note 15, at 131. See generally, Aman & Howard, Natural Gas and Electric
Utility Rate Reornm Taxation Through Ratemaking?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1085-86 (1977).
19. See generally Aman & Howard, supra note 18, at 1085-86; Monsres, The Structure of
Utility Rates in W. SICHEL & T. GIES, PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 53 (1975); I. BARNES,
supra note 15, at 319-69; J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 15, at 287-406; M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON,
supra note 15, at 222-34; C. PHILLIPS, JR., supra note 15, at 304-400; H. TRACHSEL, PUBLIC
UTILITY REGULATION, supra note 15, at 341-59.
20. [N]o requirement [exists] that rates for different classes of service be either uni-
form or equal, or even equally profitable to the utility. The requirement is merely
that rates for one class of service shall not be unreasonably prejudicial and disadvan-
tageous to a patron in any other class of service.
Philadelphia Suburban Transp. Co. v. Pennslyvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 3 Pa. Commw. Ct.
184, 193, 281 A.2d 179, 184 (1971).
21. 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1304 (Purdon) (emphasis added).
tomer classes is a question of fact for the PUC.2 2 Although not spe-
cifically required by the statute, the PUC has historically ruled that
rate structures designed to equate the revenues earned from each
customer class with the cost incurred by the utility in serving that
class provide a reasonable basis for discrimination.2 3 Cost-of-service
principles are deemed to be fair because each customer class pays
only for the cost incurred by the utility in serving that class, and thus
no group must subsidize another group's service.24 Historical trends
in rate structures and changing patterns of territorial growth are ad-
ditional pricing determinants that are relevant to the extent that they
relate to the utility's plans for the development of the system.2 5 So-
cial goals, however, have been rejected as inappropriate to the design
of rate structures.26
After the PUC renders a determination on the reasonableness of
22. Philadelphia Suburban Transp. Co. v. Pennslyvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 3 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 184, 191-92, 281 A.2d 179, 184 (1971).
23. Id
In the minds of many, fairness is attained when a customer pays what a service
costs. Notions of fairness come into play with respect to discrimination. Discrimina-
tion could be defined as charging a different price for what is essentially the same
service. It has generally been acknowledged that the goal is to discriminate "fairly"
as among the various classes of customers, and customers within a class.
PA. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, GENERIC RATE STRUCTURE INVESTIGATION
6 (1977) [hereinafter cited as EXECUTIVE SUMMARY]; see also Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n
v. Duquesne Light Co., 48 Pa. P.U.C. 14, 73-74 (1974).
Average cost rate structures properly seek to allocate the utility's revenue require-
ment so that the prices charged to consumers for services reflect only the actual costs
the utility has incurred in providing these services; such an approach would eliminate
subsidization among customer classes and customers pay their own way. In so doing,
a utility recovers its full costs-no more and no less.
Aman & Howard, supra note 16, at 1086.
24. Spanish Senior Citizens v. UGI Corp., 50 Pa. P.U.C. 256 (1976); Pennslyvania Pub.
Util. Comm'n v. Philadelphia Suburban Water Co., 48 Pa. P.U.C. 358, 395-404 (1974); Frank
W. Brownfield v. Uniontown Water Company, 42 Pa. P.U.C. 156, 162 (1965); Application of
Manufacturers Light & Heat Co. 38 Pa. P.U.C. 394 (1960); Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v.
Mfrg. Light & Heat Co., 31 Pa. P.U.C. 540, 594-96 (1953); City of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia
Transp. Co., 28 Pa. P.U.C. 176, 189-201 (1949); Calvert Wine Co. v. Pennsylvania Power Co.,
24 Pa. P.U.C. 528 (1943); Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 20 Pa.
P.U.C. 118 (1939); Harley D. Carpenter v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 20 Pa. P.U.C. 421 (1939);
Aman & Howard, supra note 18, at 1086. See generally J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 15, at 66-81.
25. Rate structure, which is an essential, integral component of rate-making, is not
merely a mathematical exercise applying theoretical principles. Rate structure must
be based on the hard economic facts of life and a complete and thorough knowledge
and understanding of all the facts and circumstances which affect rates and serv-
ices . ..
Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, City of Reading v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 44 Pa. P.U.C.
709, 751 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1970).
A cost of service study can be used as a guide to assist in maintaining a reason-
able balance of earnings among classes of customers. While a cost-of-service study is
important, it should not be the sole basis of rate design, but rather should be tem-
pered with other factors such as existing historical rate structures, growth in system
peak, and changing territorial growth patterns.
Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Duquesne Light Co., 48 Pa. P.U.C. 14, 74 (Pa. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1974).
26. Spanish Senior Citizens v. UGI Corp., 50 Pa. P.U.C. 256 (1976); Pennsylvania Pub.
Util. Comm'n v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 91 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 321, 372-375 (Pa. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1971).
the rate structure, the decision may receive appellate review for er-
rors of law, lack of substantial evidence to support the PUC's find-
ings of fact, or violations of constitutional rights.2 7 Generally, the
courts allow the PUC broad latitude by upholding the PUC's finding
of fact that a rate structure is reasonable.28 Unlike the standard re-
quired for the PUC's determination of a "fair rate of return,
'29
courts have not required specific administrative findings on the non-
discriminatory nature of a rate structure to support a PUC decision
on the reasonableness of that rate structure,3" but have inferred such
a basis from the record.3'
PUC rulings are also largely immune from attacks based on
equal protection grounds.32 Since ratemaking has the effect of a leg-
islative act 33 and interferes with an economic right, the applicable
constitutional test is whether a rational basis exists for the difference
in treatment among the customer classes.34 The constitutional deter-
27. Philadelphia Suburban Transp. Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 3 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 184, 189-90, 281 A.2d 179, 183 (1971) (citing § 1107 of the Public Utility Law, Act
of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1053, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66 § 1437, thereafter repealed by
Act 53 of April 28, 1978, P.L. 202; subject now controlled by § 704 of the Administrative
Agency Law, 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 704 (Purdon), which provides for a similar scope of
review with one clarification; see note 36 infra).
28. "[Tihe agency with the power to fix rates is invested with a 'flexible limit of judg-
ment.'" United States Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 37 Pa. Commw. Ct.
195, 205, 390 A.2d 849, 855 (1978). "[Tlhe Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission's exercise
of its discretion must be accepted by the courts unless its action is totally without support in the
record .. " Philadelphia Suburban Transp. Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 3 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 184, 191, 281 A.2d 179, 183 (1971). But see Lefkowitz v. New York Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 40 N.Y.2d 1047, 360 N.E.2d 918 (1976) (close examination of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a finding on the reasonableness of discrimination).
29. See West Penn Power Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 33 Pa. Commw. Ct.
403, 407-09, 381 A.2d 1337, 1338-39 (1978); Pennsylvania Gas & Water Co. v. Pennsylvania
Pub. Util. Comm'n, 33 Pa. Commw. Ct. 143, 149, 381 A.2d 996, 1000 (1977).
30. Natona Mills, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 179 Pa. Super. Ct. 263, 268-
69, 116 A.2d 876, 879 (1955). Seegeneraly Allied Chem. Corp. v. Georgia Power Co., 236 Ga.
548, 555, 224 S.E.2d 396, 401 (1976). Unless the regulatory body makes findings of fact and
articulates the rationale by which the particular rate structure is deemed reasonable and not
unreasonably discriminatory, a reviewing court will have difficulty determining whether the
administrative judgment is supported by evidence on the record. The regulatory body's deter-
mination may thereby be immune from effective judicial review. Aman & Howard, supra note
18, at 1106.
31. Natona Mills, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 179 Pa. Super. Ct. 263, 116
A.2d 876 (1955).
32. No Pennsylvania cases have recognized an equal protection attack on the reasonable-
ness of a rate structure. The scope of appellate review of a PUC decision may, however,
include the authority to make an independent judgment concerning the rational basis of the
discrimination in rates. See WCAB v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 517, 353
A.2d 79 (1976) (equal protection attack on the reasonableness of classifications in a workmen's
compensation statute).
33. Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, 284 U.S. 370, 380-81 (1932); Abington Sewerage
Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 344 Pa. 366, 369-70, 25 A.2d 334, 337 (1942); Penn-
sylvania R.R. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 125 Pa. Super. Ct. 558, 190 A. 367 (1937).
34. See Allied Chem. Corp. v. Georgia Power Co., 236 Ga. 548, 552, 224 S.E.2d 396,
399-402 (1976). The Allied Chemical decision reveals the ease with which this test can be
passed.
In short, the evidence before the court was adequate to show that the higher
price assessed the industrial class rested upon a rational basis which was reasonably
mination is equivalent, however, to the initial decision made by the
PUC on the reasonableness of the rate structure. Since this issue
constitutes a question of fact for the PUC,35 the courts leave the
question to the expertise of the PUC, the administrative agency cre-
ated to render such a determination, subject to the requirement that
there exist substantial evidence for the decision.36 Consequently,
PUC determinations on the reasonableness of rate structures rarely
fail this generous appellate test.3 7
III. The Lifeline Proposals
A. Ability to Pay
The first type of lifeline proposal identifies those groups of con-
sumers most in need of financial assistance and charges them a spe-
cial low rate for their entire electrical consumption. 8 Consumers
related to legitimate ends of rate making. So long as this is so, it is no valid ground
for complaint under equal protection principles that greater "fairness" might have
been achieved through overhauling the rate system in a different manner.
ld at 555, 224 S.E.2d at 401.
35. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
36. Actually, the commonwealth court and its predecessor in the role of the review of
PUC decisions, the superior court, have not been consistent in their holdings that substantial
evidence or merely competent evidence is required to support a finding on the issue of discrim-
ination by the PUC. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 37 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 173, 191, 390 A.2d 865, 873 (1978) (required merely support by competent evidence); Phila-
delphia Suburban Transp. Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 184,
190, 281 A.2d 179, 183 (1971) (required substantial and competent evidence); Deitch Company
v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 204 Pa. Super Ct. 102, 109-10, 203 A.2d 515, 519-20
(1964) (required competent evidence); Carpenter v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 141 Pa.
Super. Ct. 447, 452-55, 15 A.2d 473, 475-76 (1940) (required substantial and competent evi-
dence); Bell Telephone Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util Comm'n, 135 Pa. Super. Ct. 218, 222, 5
A.2d 410, 412 (1939), appeal dirmissed, 309 U.S. 30 (1940) (required competent evidence). Sec-
tion 1107 of the Public Utility Law, Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1053, as amended, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 66, § 1437, set forth the standard of appellate review for PUC decisions that there not
be a "lack of evidence to support the finding." Thus, judicial ambiguity was invited. Section
1107 was repealed, however, by Act 53 of April 28, 1978, P.L. 202. The subject is now con-
trolled by § 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 704 (Purdon),
which requires a clearer test of "substantial evidence."
37. Eg., the appellant in United States Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n,
37 Pa. Commw. Ct. 173, 390 A.2d 865 (1978), mounted a serious challenge to this appellate
test, urging the court to abandon the traditional test and scrutinize more closely whether the
PUC had departed from its historical cost-of-service approach in favor of one based on social
policy considerations. 37 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 184-85, 390 A.2d at 870. The commonwealth
court, however, declined to accept such a plea, holding that the PUC is authorized to consider
social factors in the design of rate structures, and should be vested with broad discretion in its
determinations on the reasonableness of rate structures. Id at 185-86, 390 A.2d at 871.
38. See, e.g., Re Potomac Elec. Power Co., 84 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 250, 255 (D.C.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970) (proposal that a rate increase not be applied to residential customers
who have incomes less than $5,500 for a family of four persons, and those who are receiving
welfare payments, social security, or unemployment compensation); Mass. Dep't of Public
Utilities, Investigation by the Department on its Own Motion as to the Propriety of the Rates
and Charges Set Forth in Schedules M.D.P.U. Nos. 398 to 413, Filed by the Massachusetts
Electric Company with the Department on November 16, 1977, to Become Effective December
1, 1977 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Massachusetts Investigation] (proposal of lower rate for
customers 65 years of age or older who are heads of households and recipients of supplemental
security income from the Social Security Administration); Re Detroit Edison Co., Case No. U-
5502, Order Issued September 28, 1978 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1978) (proposal of optional
qualify for these low rates if their incomes are less than a prescribed
maximum level or if they, as heads of households, are older than a
prescribed age. 39  Because the special rates do not recover for the
utility the cost incurred in serving this preferred group, other cus-
tomer classes must pay what amounts to a surcharge in addition to
their own cost-of-service. 4°
Unlike traditional cost-of-service rate structures and the low-us-
age4 1 and LRIC42 lifeline proposals, rates based on the customers'
ability to pay can be justified solely on the basis of social policy.
Proponents of this plan reason that a minimum amount of electricity
is a necessity in the modem world, and since the financially disad-
vantaged may not be able to afford the rising price of this service, the
regulatory commission should approve rates that provide the neces-
sary minimum supply at a price the poor and the elderly can af-
ford.43 Since neither public utility codes nor courts generally require
an exclusive cost-of-service approach," a decision by the regulatory
commission that an ability-to-pay proposal constitutes a reasonable
basis for a rate structure merely requires a shift from cost-of-service
precedents to a recognition that society benefits from the open con-
sideration of the social consequences of rate structure alternatives.45
Implicit in the view that social policy should not influence the design
rate for customers over the age of 62 and heads of households); Re Utah Power and Light
Company, Case Nos. 78-035-13, 78-035-14, Orders Issued August 17, 1978, November 1, 1978
(Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1978) (proposal for exemption of customers over the age of 65, who
are heads of households, from rate increase for the first 400 kwh consumed).
39. See generally, note 38 supra.
40. Id See also Cohn, Current Proposals in Rate Design, PUB. UTIL. FORT. December 18,
1975, at 25.
41. See notes 81-86 and accompanying text infra.
42. See notes 98-99 and accompanying text infra.
43. Basic utility services such as electricity are essential to health and an acceptable
standard of living in this country, and no person should be compelled by economic
circumstances to which he may be subjected through no fault of his own, to be with-
out such a service. It is a fundamental premise today that persons unable to provide
food and shelter for themselves should be helped by a compassionate and relatively
affluent society.
Re Public Serv. Co. of N.H., 95 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 401, 448 (N.H. Pub. Util. Comm'n
1972). The Commission, nevertheless, concluded that such aid should be given by taxpayers at
large rather than indirectly by the other ratepayers of the company. Id See Re Rate Conces-
sions to Poor Persons and Senior Citizens, 14 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 87 (Ore. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1976); J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 15, at 112; Cohn, supra note 40, at 25.
44. The Pennsylvania PUC is not required by statute nor court decision to follow the
cost-of-service approach.
45. See note 59 and accompanying text infra. See also Gray, The Passing of the Public
Utility Concept, 16 J. OF LAND AND PUB. UTIL. ECON. 8 (1940). Gray claims that the public
utility concept of regulation has been perverted to anti-social ends and that it is designed to
attain limited objectives by negative means:
[T]he whole tenor of these laws is negative and restrictive; they prohibit certain
obvious forms of monopolistic misbehavior but fail to impose definite responsibility
for socially desirable action ...
This being the case, private utility monopolists will have regard for these broad
social objectives only when by so doing they can increase or maintain their own
profit.
Id at 16.
of rate structures is the assumption that the cost-of-service approach
is neutral in its impact on social goals.46 Rate structures based on
cost-of-service principles, however, actually reinforce and legitimize
the existing inequities in income distribution.47
Thus, while it may be possible to avoid consciously considering
social policy in the design of a rate structure, it is impossible to avoid
implementing the social values inherent in their design.48 For this
reason, it is only realistic to require that social policy be expressly
recognized in the decisions of regulatory commissions.49
1. Recognition andAdoption ofAbilily-to-Pay Theory.-Social
policies have traditionally played roles in the design of rate struc-
tures. Within these structures an effort to benefit a specific class of
customers constitutes a permissible goal.5 ° For example, New York
City long delayed raising the subway fare above five cents and con-
tinued resisting attempts to make the subway system self-support-
ing.5 In this case, however, the practical difficulties involved in
administering rate schedules that differentiate on the basis of income
levels, and the tradition against personal discrimination, resulted in
the approval of a below-cost rate level available to all consumers.
5 2
Recently, the Michigan Public Service Commission sanctioned
46. Id at 15.
47. Confronted with equal rates for all residential customers without regard to their abil-
ity to pay, some customers may not be able to afford a necessary minimum amount of electric-
ity.
48. Enough perhaps has been said to demonstrate the "institutional decadence" of
the public utility concept. It originated as a system of social restraint designed prima-
rily, or at least ostensibly, to protect consumers from the aggressions of monopolists;
it has ended as a device to protect the property, i.e. the capitalized expectancy, of
these monopolists from the just demands of society, and to obstruct the development
of socially superior institutions. . . . Here, as in other areas of our economic and
social life, the compelling sanctions of private industry and private profit, working
within a framework of special privilege, determined the direction and outlook of
public policy. Just as in the days of the Empire all roads led to Rome, so in a capital-
istic society all forms of social control lead ultimately to state protection of the domi-
nant interest, i~e. property.
See note 46 supra.
49. Critics might counter this proposition by observing that such reinforcement occurs
with all pricing mechanisms that do not differentiate on the basis of ability-to-pay principles.
A distinction should be made, however, between the fixing of prices by private industry, the
interest of which is limited to the narrow concern of profit, and the fixing of rates by the PUC.
When the legislature delegates the price fixing authority to a state agency with the responsibil-
ity to implement just rates that are not unreasonably discriminatory, one must expect the
agency to utilize a broader perspective.
50. See Wallace, ECONOMIC STANDARDS OF GOVERNMENT PRICE CONTROL, TEMPO-
RARY NATIONAL ECONOMICS COMMITTEE, INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF Eco-
NOMIC POWER, 76TH CONG., 3D SESS., MONOGRAPH No. 32, 475-78 (1941); W. BAUMOL,
WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE THEORY OF THE STATE 127; (1952) Boiteux, 58 REVUE
GENERALE DE L'ELECTRICITIE 321 (1949); J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 15, at 292 n.4; see gener-
ally, H. STONE, PUBLIC CONTROL OF BUSINESS, 197-202 (1940).
51. Id at I11.
52. This service, provided at less than cost, was defended on the basis that it was urgently
needed by a person with low income.
the consideration of social policy in the design of rate structures. 53
Although the commission approved the implementation of low-us-
age lifeline rates that can be independently justified on a cost-of-
service standard, 4 it encouraged the recognition of social policy in
rate structure decisions.
It is, however, a fundamental responsibility of this commis-
sion to look beyond the revenue-producing aspects of a rate struc-
ture if it also is to meet the requirements of sound public policy.
Today, the rate structure must be designed to enhance basic public
policy objectives in areas of consumerism, environmental protec-
tion, public health and safety and conservation of national re-
sources.
55
The Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities took the next
step by expressly recognizing the ability-to-pay principle and permit-
ting the Massachusetts Electric Company to institute a reduced rate
for customers who are over sixty-five, the head of a household and
the recipient of supplemental security income.56 After noting the
traditional acceptance of rate structures based on cost-of-service
principles,57 the Department explained that the realization that the
benefitting class of customers was "relatively small, stable. . well-
identified . .. " and "adjudged needy under any criteria,"58 justified
the current deviation from the standard. The Department also rec-
ognized that "all of society benefits, albeit intangibly, from a pro-
gram which helps the elderly poor."59
Since the justification for lifeline rates based on customers' abil-
ity to pay has no relation to cost-of-service principles, however, regu-
latory commissions have generally held that this social policy does
not constitute a reasonable basis upon which to base a rate struc-
ture.60
53. Re Detroit Edison Co., 3 PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 209 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1974).
54. Id at 248-50.
55. Id at 249.
56. Massachusetts Investigation, supra note 38, at 70.
57. Id at 71.
58. Id at 72.
59. This recognition justified the assessment of the unrecovered costs to all other cus-
tomer classes. Id at 72.
60. See note 11 supra.
Furthermore, the cost justification that exists for charging low rates for the elderly on
airplanes and railroads does not apply to the electric utility industry. Cohn, supra note 40, at
26. In the former industries, full use of the existing capacity results in decreased costs for all
users. For example, if a subway system must be in continuous operation, inexpensive rates for
the poor and the elderly are justified insofar as any additional patronage would not be forth-
coming absent the reduced rates. See generally M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, supra note 15, at
222-29. Given the high proportion of fixed costs in these industries, cheap rates for special
groups result in lower rates for all customer groups if the speical rates encourage any contribu-
tion to the recovery of the fixed costs of operating the system. With electrical usage, however,
low rates for the poor and elderly do not encourage additional patronage as effectively. Cohn,
supra note 40, at 26.
2. Criticism of 4bility-to-Pay Theory. -Although some regula-
tory commissions have, nevertheless, adopted social policy as a fac-
tor to be consciously evaluated in the design of rate structures,
6'
critics of lifeline rates emphasize the many problems associated with
such an undertaking. The fundamental criticism is that open discus-
sion and evaluation of social policy as an affirmative basis of rate
discrimination during commission proceedings would politicize the
ratemaking process.62 The "objectivity" of a cost-of-service analysis
would no longer be available, so that no objective standard would
exist for reconciling the various points of view that comprise the
"public interest. 63 In this sense, the limited political accountability
of the commission creates the danger that the management of the
subsidy problem would result in a form of taxation without represen-
tation.64
The injection of social values into the ratemaking process also
has an adverse effect on economic efficiency by distorting the alloca-
tion of resources.65 One example advanced is that of the special low
rents often charged for the poor and the elderly in public housing
projects.66 Although some of the deserving social groups benefit
from the reduced rates, chronic housing shortages, deterioration
through reduced maintenance efforts and other economic disloca-
tions result.
67
Opponents of lifeline rates also observe that since public policy
61. See notes 53-60 and accompanying text supra.
62. Aman & Howard, supra note 18, at 1087-88.
This is not to suggest that consumer groups with various points of view should
not participate in the rate making process; however, without definable rate-making
standards of rate formulation, there will be no relatively objective way of reconciling
the various components of the "public interest" represented by these groups.
Id at 1087 n.6.
63. "The determination of who subsidizes whom will depend on the political judgment
(and perhaps the political aspirations) of regulators as well as the particular policy goals cer-
tain pricing techniques purport to encourage and regulators seek to advance." Id. at 1087-88.
See also Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 91 PUB. U. REP.3d (PUR)
321 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1971), in which case the PUC refused to grant a special electric
rate for a mass transit company.
Rates for transit, based on the cost of service, are well within our jurisdiction,
but, to. . .recognize the alleged unique position of said state agency engaged in the
operation of mass transit, based not only on the cost of providing the service, but also
upon the overall "public interest," is not permissible.
Id at 373.
64. See Aman & Howard, supra note 18, at 1087-88.
65. NATIONAL CONSUMER INFORMATION CENTER, HANDBOOK FOR CONSUMER ADVO-
CATES: ELECTRIC UTILTIY RATE PROCEEDINGS (May 1976) (Testimony of Robert H. Frank,
Before the Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.) [hereinafter cited as Testimony of Robert H. Frank].
66. Id
67. Id In a competitive market the price mechanism equates the supply of and the de-
mand for a product by encouraging production in amounts that will afford sufficient profits to
producers and by discouraging consumption by those unwilling or unable to pay such a price.
Thus, if the price for housing is set artificially low with a subsidy, the demand for the housing
will exceed the supply. Other economic dislocations result as the impact of this artificial price
is reflected in the prices of other products and services. See generally A. LERNER, ECONOMICS
OF CONTROL (1947).
provides the justification for the special rates,68 the public as a whole
should bear the expense. 69 They claim that it is unfair to charge only
other electricity users with the surcharge necessary to recover the
utility's costs. 70 Therefore, the subsidy should be explicitly recog-
nized, and a tax should be imposed upon all taxpayers for its sup-
port.7 '
One final objection to the implementation of ability-to-pay rates
is that alternative means of assisting the disadvantaged exist 72 that
are more effective, less discriminatory and less likely to cause distor-
tions in resource allocation.73 Critics view the availability of the al-
ternative means as rendering the lifeline concepts unreasonable.
Thus, a commission with no authority to implement the alternative
means of assisting the disadvantaged is, when confronted with this
objection, afforded a convenient basis for declaring lifeline rates un-
reasonably discriminatory without making an independent ruling on
the merits of the lifeline concept.74 Consequently, no effective aid is
furnished.
B. Low- Usage Rates
The second form of lifeline rate, often proposed in conjunction
with 75 or as an alternative to76 the rate scheme based on ability-to-
pay principles, discriminates according to the amount of electricity
68. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
69. Re Public Serv. Co. of N.H., 95 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 401, 448 (N.H. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1971); Cohn, supra note 40, at 26.
70. Re Public Service Co. of N.H., 95 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 401, 448 (N.H. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1971); Cohn, supra note 40, at 26.
71. Re Public Service Co. of N.H., 95 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 401, 448-49 (N.H. Pub.
Util. Comm'n 1971); Cohn, supra note 40, at 26.
72. PA. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N FINAL REPORT, GENERIC RATE STRUCTURE INVESTIGA-
TION (1977) [hereinafter cited as Final Report]. The report cites the following as examples:
direct supplements to the income of low income families (increased welfare grants), direct
payment of utility bills by welfare agencies, and the fuel stamp program (similar to the food
stamp program), Id at 10-18. See also Re Rate Concessions to Poor Persons and Senior
Citizens, 14 PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 87, 94 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1976).
73. J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 15, at 116 (progressive taxation, social security, and free
public education, can be used more feasibly and less harmfully than a system of discriminatory
pricing; more promising attack on the maldistribution of income lies in a direct attack on its
causes, not in the administration of antidotes). Contra, Testimony of Robert H Frank, supra
note 65, at 185 (perverse work incentives inhere in welfare and food stamp programs); Brief for
Central Pennsylvania Legal Services, Generic Rate Structure Investigation 31-37 (Pa. Pub.
Util. Comm'n 1977) (notes low participation rate for eligible families in welfare and food
stamp programs, poor political climate for increased welfare assistance, bureaucratic problems
associated with welfare and food stamp program).
74. See, e.g., Public Serv. Co. of N.H., 95 PUB. U. REP 3d (PUR) 401 (N.H. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1972); Re Rate Concessions to Poor Persons and Senior Citizens, 14 PUB. U. REP. 4th
(PUR) 87 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1976); Final Report, supra note 72.
75. E.g., Massachusetts Investigation, supra note 38; Re Utah Power and Light Com-
pany, Case Nos. 78-035-13, 78-035-14, Orders issued August 17, 1978, November 1, 1978
(Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1978).
76. E.g., Re Potomac Elec. Power Co., 84 PUB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 250 (D.C. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1970); Re Rate Concession to Poor Persons and Senior Citizens, 14 PUB. U. REP. 4th
(PUR) 87 (Ore. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1976).
actually used by each customer." This lifeline scheme charges all
residential consumers a low rate for a minimum amount of electric-
ity consumed per month.7" This minimum level of usage is set by
the regulatory commission at an amount deemed sufficient to meet
the needs of an average customer who uses only basic "no frills"
appliances, and who does not use electric space heating, water heat-
ing, cooking or air conditioning.79 The low rate applies only to a
predetermined level of usage; a higher rate is applied to any excess.
80
Although social policy forms the principal motivation for the
low-usage rate, the proposal can also be justified on the basis of
traditional cost-of-service principles. 8' The amount of generating
capacity required by a utility is determined by the maximum de-
mand for service, the peak load that the utility's customers may place
upon the system.82 The utility must build generating capacity that is
sufficient to satisfy demand during peak periods,83 even if it must
generate electricity at levels far less than capacity during off-peak
periods.84  In service areas that contain a high proportion of indus-
trial and high-usage residential demand, the high-usage customers
are largely responsible for the needed additional generating capacity.
According to cost-of-service principles, high-usage customers are
thus more costly to serve and should bear the costs incurred by the
utility in building the added capacity. 85 Consequently, the consump-
77. See, e.g., Boston Edison Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 932, 375
N.E.2d 305 (1978); Re Detroit Edison Co., 3 PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 209, 248-50 (Mich. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1974); Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 50 Pa. P.U.C.
511, 518 (1977).
78. See, e.g., cases cited in note 75 supra.
79. Testimony of Joe D. Pace, supra note 6, at 273-74. Compare id with Re California
Pac. Util. Co., 17 PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 256 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1976) (California
allows lifeline quantities of electrical consumption for five specific end uses: space heating,
cooking, lighting, water heating and food refrigeration; lifeline rates are unavailable for power
for air conditioning, domestic well pumping, television sets, washers and driers, and small
electric appliances).
80. See, e.g., cases cited in note 75 supra.
81. This proposal incorporates, into a cost-of-service analysis, the LRIC idea that each
customer should pay for the actual costs incurred by the utility to serve that class. Under cost-
of-service principles, rates are fixed so that each customer class contributes to the revenue
requirement not on the basis of the total, actual costs to the utility incurred to serve that class,
but in proportion to the actual costs incurred to serve that class. While the LRIC approach
directly assigns the actual costs of constructing additional capacity to high-usage customers,
the low-usage rate does so indirectly. See note 97 infra.
82. See generally Re Potomac Elec. Power Co., 84 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) 250, 254 (D.C.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1970); Boston Edison Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 78 Mass. Adv. Sh.
932, 375 N.E.2d 305, 333 (1978); Cudahy & Malko, Electric Peak-Load Pricing." Madison Gas
and Beyond, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 47; M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, supra note 15, at 222-29.
83. Most electric utilities, however, have the option of purchasing electricity from other
companies at peak periods of demand, which option reduces their need for greater capacity.
See C. PHILLIPS, supra note 15, at 574-76 (description of the concept of power pools designed
to avoid the necessity for electric utilities to individually maintain sufficient capacity to ac-
commodate peak periods). See generally M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, supra note 15, at 15-16.
84. See generally M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, supra note 15, at 222-29.
85. See also United States Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 37 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 173, 187, 390 A.2d 865, 871 (1978) (commonwealth court acknowledged that the
tion of the minimum amount of electricity should appropriately be
exempted from rate increases required for the utility's return on the
additional generating capacity.86
Nevertheless, commissions have sometimes rejected low-usage
rate proposals because they mistakenly treat the social motivation
87
as the justification for the rate structure. 8 These cost-of-service
commissions claim that the rates are not justified because they do not
fully and exclusively effect the goal of providing an inexpensive min-
imum supply of energy to the poor and elderly.89 Needy customers
with large families that consequently use large amounts of electricity
would not receive the low rate for the amount consumed in excess of
the lifeline level, but many affluent families that spend little time at
their homes or that own second homes would receive the benefit of
the low rate for their entire consumption. 90 Since this objection is
directed at the motivation behind the proposal rather than the justifi-
cation for it, the criticism is fallacious. Commissions professing a
cost-of-service standard should examine the cost-of-service justifica-
tions for low-usage rate structures; if the rates meet that standard,
the alleged social inadequacies of such rate structures are not rele-
vant to the determination of reasonableness.
new nuclear power plants built in response to increased demand during peak periods are less
costly to operate generally and that the resultant reduction in running costs would especially
benefit high volume customers). Several other regulatory commissions have recognized this
fact and have adopted rate structures that conform to such a theory of cost allocation. See
Boston Edison Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 78 Mass. Adv. Sh. 932, 375 N.E.2d 305, 333
(1978); Re Detroit Edison Co., 3 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 209 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1974); Re Detroit Edison Co., Case No. U-5502 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1978); Re Utah
Power and Light Co., Orders Issued August 17, 1978, November 1, 1978, Case Nos. 78-035-13,
78-035-14 (Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n).
86. See note 85 supra. Some still hold the view that low usage rates are not justified on
cost-of-service principles and are, therefore, unreasonably discriminatory. Eg., Re Kansas
Power and Light Co., 20 PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 55, 63 (Kan. State Corp. Comm'n 1977); L.
FLAX & M. DRAZEN, CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES IN THE DESIGN OF ELECTRIC UTIL-
ITY RATES 54 (1976). Critics observe that the additional generating requirement imposed on
the utility is exactly the same if a new residential user attaches to the system and uses 200
kilowatt hours (kwh) per month or if an existing user increases his usage from 1,000 to 1,200
kwh per month. L. FLAX & M. DRAZEN, supra at 39. Although the total monthly generating
requirement is affected to the same degree, the relevant consideration, in terms of cost-of-
service, is the customer's contribution to total demand at peak periods. See notes 82-84 and
accompanying text supra. See also note 76 supra.
87. Eg., Testimony of Joe D. Pace, supra note 6 at 275-76, "(low-usage rates constitute an
important policy instrument designed to assure that all households, especially the poor, can
obtain the minimum amount of energy required to support a decent standard of living; a desir-
able way to redistribute real income to the poor.)" Apartment House Council of Metropolitan
Washington v. Public Serv. Commn'n of D.C., 332 A.2d 53, 57-58 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975); Re
Detroit Edison Co., 3 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 209, 249-50 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974).
88. Eg., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 23, at 21-22.
89. Id; Cohn, supra note 40, at 25; Re Kansas Power and Light Co., 20 PUB. U. REP. 4th
(PUR) 55, 63 (Kan. State Corp. Comm'n 1977).
90. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 23, at 21-22.
C Long-Run Incremental Cost Pricing
A third lifeline proposal 9' charges a low rate to the poor and the
elderly based on long-run incremental cost theory (LRIC), a variant
of marginal cost theory92 adapted to the electric utility industry.
This lifeline proposal is premised on the belief that LRIC rates will
yield revenues in a sum greater than that justified by traditional
ratemaking principles. 93 A reduction in the rates charged to some
customers is, therefore, necessary to equalize the earned revenue
with the level of revenue allowed by the commission.94 The LRIC
lifeline proposal identifies the elderly and the poor as the benefi-
ciaries of the necessary adjustment on the basis that these customer
classes have low price elasticities of demand.95
1. Inverse Price Elasticity Adustment. -According to tradi-
91. Eg., J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 15, at 304; Cohn, supra note 40, at 24; Aman & How-
ard, supra note 18, at 1103-04.
92. See generally Huntington, The Rapid Emergence of Marginal Cost Pricing in the Regu-
lation of Electric Utility Rate Structures, 55 B.U.L. REv. 689 (1975) (LRIC pricing modifies
marginal cost theory in two ways to meet the particular needs of the electric utility industry).
Huntington explains the preference for utilizing "incremental cost" over "marginal cost" as
follows:
Strictly speaking, marginal cost refers to the cost of increasing output by the
smallest possible unit-increasing electric generating capacity, for example, by one
kilowatt. Needless to say, utilities do not add generating capacity in one kilowatt
increments. Consequently, utility costs are calculated for increments of discrete
blocks of output. Although these costs may be expressed in dollars per kilowatt, they
are derived by calculating the cost of a new generating unit or new transmission line
actually planned by the utility. To differentiate the costs so calculated from strict
"marginal costs" of the smallest possible additional units of output, the term "incre-
mental cost" is generally applied.
Id at 731.
The long-run measurement is preferred over the short-run type because long-run incre-
mental costs are more stable and, therefore, provide a more appropriate basis for long-range
planning by utilities and consumers. Id at 730.
93. Traditional ratemaking principles provide that a utility should be permitted to charge
rates that will earn revenues sufficient to cover its operating expenses and to provide a fair rate
of return on the utility's rate base. See notes 17-19 and accompanying text supra.
See generall L. FLAX & M. DRAZEN, supra note 86, at 58. Flax and Drazen outline the
reasons why LRIC rates, which are based partially upon estimates of future costs, will be so
high and thereby produce the excess revenue problem:
Until fairly recently, the unit cost (investment per kilowatt of capacity) of new
utility equipment was declining due to economies of scale and improved technology.
As a result, growth in demand led to the installation of new plants which decreased
unit costs and benefitted all users. Growth was desirable and was encouraged. At the
same time, interest rates remained relatively stable and common stock investors were
content with relatively low dividend yields in the anticipation of continued growth
and stability. In the last few years, however, the cost of utility plants has increased
tremendously. Concurrently, the returns which investors demanded on their funds
have reached historic highs. Bonds which were sold 30 years ago at an interest cost of
3% must now be refinanced at 10%. In addition, the continuing cost decreases due to
technological advances (development of increasingly larger generating units) which
characterized an earlier period have been exhausted, for the moment at least. Thus
the cost of replacing worn-out plants even to maintain the same level of service




95. See notes 98-99 and accompanying text infra.
tional economic theory, if prices of goods are set equal to the margi-
nal cost incurred by the company in producing the last unit of
output, an equilibrium volume of production and demand for the
product will be attained,96 and society's productive resources will
thereby be allocated most efficiently.97 Since LRIC pricing is
modeled after marginal cost pricing, the LRIC rates induce demand
levels from customer classes that encourage an efficient allocation of
resources for the generation of electricity. Lifeline proponents favor
a proposal, known as the inverse price elasticity of demand (IPE)
adjustment, that would reduce LRIC rates to those customers whose
demand for electricity would change the least in response to the rate
reduction.98 The consistency between the effects of the IPE adjust-
ment and the goal of LRIC pricing justifies IPE as a reasonable basis
for discrimination.99
Lifeline proponents claim that the poor and the elderly have
low price elasticities of demand."° Income limitations restrict the
96. We can define marginal cost very generally as the cost of society's scarce re-
sources which must be used to produce one additional unit of some commodity or the
value of resources that would be saved by producing one less unit of that commod-
ity. . . . Consumers decide how they will divide their incomes among different com-
modities by looking at the relative prices of these commodities. Prices act as signals
to consumers indicating the cost to them of additional consumption of various com-
modities. To the extent that commodity prices are equal to the marginal social costs
of production, these pricing signals indicate simultaneously the cost of commodities
to individual consumers and the cost of producing such commodities from the view-
point of society as a whole. With prices set equal to marginal cost, consumers' deci-
sions regarding the trade-offs associated with the consumption of different
commodities are guided by signals which reflect the actual production of these com-
modities ...
There is, I submit, no real argument about whether marginal cost pricing is right
or wrong. If our goal is economic efficiency, it is almost definitional that the prices of
commodities must reflect the marginal social cost of supplying these commodities.
Rate Design for Elec. Corp., 15 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 434, 439-40 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1976) (testimony of Dr. Paul Joskow, associate professor of economics at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology). See generally A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCI-
PLES AND INSTITUTIONS 66 (1971); Aman & Howard, supra note 18, at 1092.
97. See note 96 supra. Unlike cost-of-service pricing, LRIC rates achieve an optimal
allocation of resources by ensuring that the cost to society of providing the last increment of
output to each customer class will equal the value--the price--that each class places on that
increment of service. Cost-of-service pricing, however, does not allocate revenue responsibility
to the various customer classes according to the actual costs that will be incurred by the utility
in serving a particular customer class. Rather, the requisite revenue contribution from each
customer class to the revenue requirement, which is based on historical rather than expected
current costs, is determined in proportion to the actual estimated cost to the utility of serving
each customer class. Since the price requested by the utility for each level of consumption
does not reflect the actual costs of producing that level of output, the price mechanism does not
encourage levels of consumption--optimal levels-for which the value of a particular level of
consumption to a consumer will equal the cost of producing that amount. See generally Hunt-
ington, supra note 92, at 718-38.
98. For discussions of other possible adjustment proposals, see Aman & Howard, supra
note 18, at 1095-1100; Testimony of Robert H Frank, supra note 65, at 168-87.
99. Testimony ofRobert H. Frank, supra note 65, at 168-69; Testimony of Joe D. Pace,
supra note 6, at 302; Aman & Howard, supra note 18, at 1098 n.40.
100. Brief for Consumer Educ. and Protective Ass'n at 21, United States Steel Corp. v.
Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 37 Pa. Commw. Ct. 173, 390 A.2d 865 (1978); Brief for
Central Pennsylvania Legal Services, at 51 Generic Rate Structure Investigation (Pa. Pub.
Util. Comm'n 1977).
ability of these groups to respond to price changes.' 0 ' Since such
people can afford only the basic necessities in terms of electrical ap-
pliances, a mere reduction in their electrical rates provides insignifi-
cant encouragement for additional purchases of electricity
consuming products. 102 Energy costs play an important role in the
industrial consumer's decision making process, 103 however, so that a
rate reduction to this class would significantly encourage additional
consumption.""° Similarly, a more affluent consumer considering the
purchase of an expensive, high energy consumption product, such as
electric space heating or central air conditioning, may compare the
expense required to operate an electric powered system with ex-
penses required by systems based on alternative energy sources.
0 5
2. Criticism of the IPE Adjustment.-The reasonableness of
the IPE adjustment depends, however, upon the selection, as benefi-
ciary of the reduced rates, of a customer class that has the lowest
price elasticity of demand."° Critics claim, and commissions gener-
ally agree, that current price elasticity studies do not conclusively
identify any customer class as having the lowest price elasticity of
demand.0 7 Therefore, commissions find insufficient evidence to jus-
tify the approval of an IPE adjustment. 0
Critics of the IPE adjustment also contend that rate discrimina-
tion based on the price elasticity of demand of customer classes is
"unfair."'0 9 Since the availability of alternative sources of energy is
a significant influence on price elasticities of customer classes, 0 cus-
tomers similarly situated in terms of cost-of-service criteria, but for
the availability of substitute forms of energy, will be charged differ-
ent rates."' This argument implies that rate structures based on the
IPE adjustment are unfair because the customer has no control over
one of the considerations that determines which customers will re-
ceive the reduced rates. Consumers have no more control, however,
over the factors that determine the cost to the utility of serving their
particular customer class under a cost-of-service standard than do
101. See generaly note 100 supra.
102. See generally note 100 supra.
103. See generally J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 15, at 18-20, 333; M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON,
supra note 15, at 18-19, 193-95.
104. See note 103 supra.
105. See note 103 supra.
106. See notes 98-99 and accompanying text supra.
107. Rate Design for Elec. Corps., 15 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 434, 452 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n 1976). See Arkansas Power and Light Co., 19 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 53, 76-78
(Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1977); Aman & Howard, supra note 18, at 1104-05; Cohn, supra
note 40, at 25.
108. See note 107 supra.
109. See Cohn, supra note 40, at 25; L. FLAX & M. DRAZEN, supra note 86, at 63.
110. In other words, as the price of one source of energy changes relative to another
source, consumers may substitute in their purchases the relatively less expensive source.
111. Id
consumers whose low rate is based on the availability of an alterna-
tive energy source." 12 For example, a residential customer cannot
choose to purchase high-tension industrial service, which is less
costly to furnish than low-tension residential service." 13 Therefore,
when judged by notions of fairness, the IPE adjustment provides a
basis for discrimination that is as reasonable as the cost-of-service
standard. 14
3. Application and Future of LRIC Pricing and IPE Adjust-
ment.-In Madison Gas and Electric Co., 1II the Wisconsin Public
Service Commission ordered the implementation of LRIC rates.
The commission, however, avoided making an adjustment to allevi-
ate the excess earnings problem by simply declaring that total reve-
nues earned under LRIC rates would equal the utility's revenue
requirement.116 Therefore, no rate reductions were necessary."17
LRIC rates have been accepted, in principle, as the pricing pol-
icy of the future." 8 Despite the theoretical attractiveness of LRIC
pricing, regulatory commissions refuse to order implementation until
studies and experimental programs prove the practicability of these
charges.' 19 As an integral feature of LRIC pricing, the adoption of
the IPE adjustment must also wait.'
20
IV. Trend in Pennsylvania Toward Acceptance of Lifeline Rates
A. PUC Decisions
The Pennsylvania experience with lifeline proposals began in
1971 with a challenge to the proposed rate increase of Philadelphia
Electric Company. A Philadelphia Housing Authority witness testi-
fied that the Authority's tenants had low incomes, that almost sixty
112. See generally J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 15, at 372-78.
113. Id
114. Id
115. 5 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 28 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1974).
116. Id at 37.
117. Id See also L. FLAX & M. DRAZEN, supra note 86 at 59; it seems that the Wisconsin
Public Service Commission intentionally avoided the excess earnings problem in Madison Gas
and Electric.
[A]ny method of eliminating the excess revenues will result in rates which are
not equal to marginal cost. Absent any accurate data on elasticity, it cannot be deter-
mined whether the rates so derived are optimized (as regards resource allocation)
within the revenue constraint. In the Madison Gas and Electric case, the problem
simply did not arise because the total LRIC was, astonishingly, found to be almost
identical with the total allowed revenues. This was convenient, to say the least, in
that it was not necessary to confront with reality some of the harder questions result-
ing from the application of theory.
Id
118. Eg., Arkansas Power and Light Co., 19 PuB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 53 (Arkansas Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1977); Rate Design for Elec. Corps., 15 PUB. U. REP. 4th (PUR) 434 (N.Y. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n 1976).
119. See note 118 supra.
120. See note 118 supra.
percent of its tenants in Philadelphia received welfare assistance, and
that, therefore, such people should be exempted from the rate in-
crease.' 2 ' Representatives of an apartment development for retired
union members and of a senior citizens association asserted that the
rate increases should not be applicable to rate payers living on low
fixed incomes. 22 Finally, a witness for the city of Philadelphia testi-
fied that increasing power costs for the Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority (SEPTA) had outrun the company's abil-
ity to pay, and that, consequently, the city had had to absorb the
payments. 23 He urged the institution of a special rate for mass
transit companies in recognition of the public interest they serve.' 24
Sharing the majority view on the unacceptability of ability-to-
pay rates, 125 however, the PUC stated that special rates based on
customers' ability to pay are unreasonably discriminatory. 26 In its
findings, the PUC emphasized that "[rlate structures, as established,
must be based on the electrical load and service characteristics of the
different classes of users, and equal and non-discriminatory charges
must be applied within each class."' 127 Addressing the special rate
for SEPTA based on general social policy, the PUC announced,
[r]ates for transit, based on the cost of service, are well within our
jurisprudence and regulatory jurisdiction, but, to . . . recognize
the alleged unique position of said state agency engaged in the
operation of mass transit, based not only on the cost of providing
the service, but also upon the overall "public interest," is not per-
missible. 1
28
The PUC sympathized with the disadvantaged socio-economic
groups, but declared that no unreasonable preference or prejudice in
rates could be imposed. 129 It explained that "[i]f certain reductions
or benefits were made to these socio-economic groups, the remaining
customers in respondent's system would be required to absorb this
loss in revenue requirement, in view of the fact that the utility is
entitled to a fair return under the law."' 3 ° Thus, the PUC expressed
its commitment to rate structures based on cost-of-service principles
and held that neither ability-to-pay principles nor general social pol-
icy could play roles in rate structure design. 
13
121. See Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 91 PuB. U. REP. 3d
(PUR) 321, 372 (Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n 1971).
122. Id
123. Id at 373.
124. Id
125. See notes 60-74 and accompanying text supra.
126. 91 PuB. U. REP. 3d (PUR) at 373.
127. Id at 373.
128. Id The view that rates should be based on cost-of-service factors and not on the
"public interest" coincides with the position that political views should be kept out of the
ratemaking process. See notes 62-64 and accompanying text.supra.
129. Id at 375.
130. Id
131. Id
This view was reaffirmed in a 1976 natural gas rate proceeding,
in which the Spanish Senior Citizens Council alleged that rates
charged by UGI Corporation were "unjust, unreasonable or unlaw-
fully discriminatory" as applied to elderly and low income residen-
tial customers.'32 The PUC again expressed its sympathy for the
plight of this social class, but explained that rates based on ability-to-
pay principles have no relationship to the accepted cost-of-service
criteria and are, therefore, unreasonably discriminatory. 133  The
PUC also noted that the complainants were not asking for reduced
rates for low levels of consumption, but rather for rates based solely
on customers' ability to pay. 134 The latter comment suggests that the
PUC might have reached a different conclusion had the complain-
ants requested low-usage rates, which can be justified on cost-of-
service principles.
135
The first indication of a change in PUC position on the consid-
eration of social policy in rate structure design appeared in the draft
opinion in the 1977 Bell Telephone rate case. 136 The PUC observed
that its traditional allowance of great freedom to managerial judg-
ment in the design of rate structures could no longer be justified.
37
Because of inflation, technological change, and the emergence of
competition in the telecommunication field, the PUC closely ex-
amined the proposed rate structure 138 and announced,
[w]e adopt as our guiding principle here the policy that rate struc-
ture should be based on costs, except in those situations where social
policy or the overall public interest overrides cost considerations.
In other words, in telephone rate structure, both for reasons
of economic efficiency and fairness, cost of service is always an
important, and normally is the primary basis of pricing. But cost
of service is not the only consideration. Examples of other non-
cost factors which this Commission must consider include: the
ability of various consumer classes to pay or to pass on costs of tele-
phone service; the need to fight inflation and conserve scarce natu-
132. Spanish Senior Citizens v. UGI Corp., 50 Pa. P.U.C. 256 (1976).
133. Id at 257. The PUC explained that:
[a]ny reduction of rates for selected customers on the basis of age or income must
result in higher rates for all remaining customers or lower revenue to the company.
While the Commission sympathizes with the request from elderly and fixed income
groups for rate benefits to be extended on the ability to pay, there can be no unrea-
sonable preference or prejudice to any customer under the Public Utility Law ...
Unreasonable discrimination results when customers are treated differently
while the services to be performed are alike in all material respects.
Id at 257-58.
134. Id
135. In a cost-of-service jurisdiction, rate structures that are justified on cost-of-service
principles should be adopted, regardless of the motivation behind them. See generally notes
81-86 and accompanying text supra. The PUC later abided by its suggestion and approved a
low-usage rate for the residential customers of the Philadelphia Electric Company. See notes
143-44 and accompanying text infra.
136. Short Bell Draft Opinion (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, December 15, 1977).
137. Id at 7.
138. Id
ral resources by making maximum efficient use of capacity; the
need for rates to be administerable and understandable; and,
finally, the value of the service provided.
139
The discussion of the applicability of social considerations, es-
pecially the ability of customers to pay, is highly significant because
it represents a major change in PUC policy. Its importance, how-
ever, must be tempered because the PUC chose not to include the
italicized language in its final, official order. 4 ° Nevertheless, the
opinion merits attention because it recognizes the role of social pol-
icy in rate structure decisions and, thereby, reflects the direction in
which the sympathies of the PUC are moving. Moreover, the ab-
sence of the language in the final order regarding the legitimacy of
ability-to-pay considerations, contrasted with the absence of a corre-
sponding change in the actual rate structure, warns that the reason-
ing expressed in commission opinions should be accepted with
caution. Thus, the professed justification may not be the one upon
which the PUC actually based its decision. 41 The cost-of-service
justification, especially in cases in which the supporting evidence is
thin, may be a mere facade for a rate structure based clearly on so-
cial motivations and justifications.
42
U.S. Steel raised this precise point in the appeal of a 1977 PUC
order that, consistent with the PUC's suggestion in the Spanish Se-
nior Citizens case, actually implemented low-usage rates.' 43 In a
final order arising out of a proceeding held to determine the neces-
sity of a proposed rate increase for the Philadelphia Electric Com-
pany, the PUC exempted the first 500 kwh of electrical consumption
139. Id at 7-8 (emphasis added).
140. See Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., Final Order Adopted
December 15 and 21, 1977, Entered April 4, 1978 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1978). The PUC did
use the following language to indicate that social policy will still be considered in rate structure
decisions, but the PUC avoided the express recognition of the legitimacy of ability-to-pay fac-
tors:
In our short form order issued earlier we discussed our position that the
problems of inflation, technological change and competition in the field of telecom-
munications require this Commission to examine Bell's rate structure proposals in
greater depth than has been the custom in the past. In this examination we will be
guided by the principles of cost-based, usage sensitive ratemaking, modified to the
extent necessary by social considerations and the necessity to avoid abrupt changes in
existing rate patterns.
Id at 27.
141. See generally notes 160-61 and accompanying text infra; see also Pennsylvania Pub.
Util. Comm'n v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 49 Pa. P.U.C. 644, 648 (1977).
In addition, the Commission because of the constraints of the constitution and
the Public Utility Law, is unable to impose upon Philadelphia Electric and other
utilities the requirement that it file a tariff structure that could relieve the low and
fixed income people from the undue hardship of rising rates they must bear. I believe
the time is coming when we will recognize that some amount of electricity, gas and
water service is a basic human necessity and right.
Id at 648 (O'Bannon, Comm'r, concurring).
142. Id
143. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 50 Pa. P.U.C. 511 (1977).
of residential customers from any portion of the rate increase. 1' 4
The PUC, however, did not state the findings of fact and reasoning
that provide the support for its judgment that such a rate structure
was reasonable. 45 Later, in response to a petition requesting ampli-
fication of its rationale, the PUC stated that it is "unnecessary and
inappropriate" to state specific reasons for its findings.1 46 "We be-
lieve that when it is clear that our findings have reasonable support
and basis in the record, they are stated sufficiently."' 147 The commis-
sioners, nevertheless, reaffirmed their commitment to cost-of-service
principles and explained that their decision was consistent with that
standard. 148
Philadelphia Electric Company's proposed allocation of certain
fixed costs does not allocate sufficient capacity cost responsibility
to the customers who stand to benefit most from newly installed
capacity. The allocation of generating plant on a coincident peak
responsibility basis did not, under the circumstances, sufficiently
recognize the benefits to high consumption customers resulting
from the decreased running costs associated with added new gen-
erating capacity. These benefits vary directly with energy con-
sumption.
Careful examination of the record will indicate ample sup-
port in the record for our conclusion. .... "9
The accuracy of the last statement was the issue presented to the
commonwealth court when, as customers of Philadelphia Electric
Company, U.S. Steel and 913 others petitioned for a review of the
PUC order.'
t5
Concurrently with the Bell Telephone and Philadelphia Electric
rate cases, the PUC conducted the Generic Rate Structure Investiga-
tion (GRS1).t5 1 That study examined "the necessity, propriety, or
144. Id Evidence presented during the hearings showed that the average monthly kwh
usage per month for residential customers without air conditioning was 500 kwh; when air
conditioning was in use, the average was mugh higher, e.g., 931 kwh in the month of August
1975. Brief for Consumer Educ. and Protective Ass'n at 13-14, United States Steel Corp. v.
Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comn'n, 37 Pa. Commw. Ct. 173, 390 A.2d 865 (1978).
145. The PUC concluded as follows on the rate structure issue:
We do not entirely agree with the Examiner's comments and recommendation
regarding the manner in which an increase in revenues should be allocated or distrib-
uted among the customers [ie., no exemption for the residential class]. We believe,
upon further consideration, that we should exempt the first 500 kwh of usage by
residential customers from any portion of this additional rate increase.
Pennsylvania Pub. Util Comm'n v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 50 Pa. P.U.C. 511, 518 (1977).
146. Id at 519-20.
147. Id But cf. notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra (in view of the dispute regarding
the justification of low-usage rates on cost-of-service principles, the appellate courts may de-
mand that the PUC state intermediate findings so that an effective judicial review may be




150. See United States Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 37 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 173, 390 A.2d 865 (1978).
151. PA. PUB. UTIL. COMM'N., GENERIC RATE STRUCTURE INVESTIGATION (Pa. Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1977) (regulatory commissions conduct generic studies to focus in on a particular
advisability of adopting, requiring, or permitting general or specific
changes in rate structure, the basis thereof and the basic policy re-
lated thereto, and rules or basic policy statements necessary to imple-
ment such changes, if any." '52 Among other considerations, the final
report of the investigation urged that cost-of-service principles con-
tinue as the basis of electric rate structures in Pennsylvania and that
development of future rates consider marginal cost concepts.
53
Although the report made no express recommendations on life-
line rates, it sharply criticized their effectiveness. 5 The PUC fo-
cused this section of the GRSI on the low-usage lifeline rate, for
which a cost-of-service justification exists. 55 The Commission, nev-
ertheless, contrary to its professed cost-of-service standard, evaluated
the acceptability of low-usage rates on the basis of their effectiveness
in aiding the poor and the elderly.'56 No mention was made of the
cost-of-service justification.'57 In a cost-of-service jurisdiction, the
discussion should have focused on that issue, and not on a criterion
of rate structure design already deemed unacceptable by the PUC. ,58
In short, if low-usage rates are cost-justified, then, consistent with a
cost-of-service approach, they should be implemented. Unless the
advocates of low-usage rates fail to note in future rate proceedings
the confusion inherent in the Generic Rale Structure Invesigation's
discussion of lifeline rate structures, the GRS1 should not signifi-
cantly affect the increasingly favorable attitudes of the commission-
ers toward low-usage rate structures.
B. Appellate Review
On its appeal from the 1977 PUC order directing the Philadel-
phia Electric Company to institute low-usage rates, U.S. Steel ar-
gued before the commonwealth court that the evidence contained in
the record provided insufficient support for the conclusion that the
exemption from the rate increase for low levels of consumption was
area of interest in a comprehensive and intensive manner that is not followed in a normal rate
case).
152. Id
153. Executive Summary, supra note 23, at 28-29.
154. Final Report, supra note 72, at Subject Number 10.
155. See id
156. Id
157. See notes 81-86 and accompanying text supra. The PUC further opined that the
existence of alternative methods designed to help the disadvantaged social groups, e.g., in-
creased welfare assistance, "fuel stamp" program, were preferable to lifeline rates. Final Re-
port, supra note 72, at 10:8-13. Contra, Testimony of Robert H. Frank, supra note 65, at 185;
Brief for Central Pennsylvania Legal Services at 32-42, Generic Rate Strucutre Investigation
(Pa. Pub. Comm'n 1977) (citing the adverse political climate for increased welfare assistance,
the low participation rate of eligible families in the alternative programs and the bureaucratic
problems involved in the administration of such alternative programs).
158. See generally notes 121-35 and accompanying text supra.
justified on cost-of-service principles. 59 Therefore, U.S. Steel main-
tained that the discussion of a cost justification disguised the actual
social motivation to shield it from judicial scrutiny. 6 ' The court,
however, followed its traditional practice of allowing the PUC broad
discretion in administrative determinations on the reasonableness of
the discrimination.' 6 1 Thus, the court held that the competent but
minimal evidence in the record supported the Commission's finding
that the low-usage rate was cost-justified.
62
The court further intimated that it would have affirmed a Com-
mission finding that the rate structure was reasonable if social policy
factors had provided the support.
16 3
We can agree with the appellants that rate making should not
be made more difficult by the employment in the process of per-
sonal socio-economic theories or, indeed, any consideration other
than the law and the facts of record. Decisions concerning the
kind and extent of the sudsidy which should be afforded to needy
residential customers should, it seems, be left by regulatory agen-
cies and courts to the legislative branch of government, as indeed
the Commission seems to have concluded in its Generic Rate
Study just mentioned. Certainly there is nothing in Pennsylvania
law which now empowers the Commission to require one cus-
tomer simply to pay another's utility bill; . . . This is not to say,
however, that rate structures may not be rearranged from time to
time in response to changes in economic conditions-whether
general changes or changes especially affecting particular classes
of customers. . . . We see no reason why in times of stringency the
utility might not propose, and the Commission might not approve,
rates for residential users less than the rates which an allocation of
large increases in necessary revenues by a strict application of cost of
service studies would suggest. 164
Here, the court's acknowledgment that other relevant factors be-
side strict cost-of-service tenets, in conjunction with the dictum ap-
proving the legitimacy of social policy as a factor to be considered in
the design of rate structures, reveals that the court may sanction a
broad scope of evidence upon which to base its findings of reasona-
bleness. 
1 65
V. Prospects for Lifeline Rates in Pennsylvania
The question whether lifeline rates are unreasonably discrimi-
natory depends upon the standard used to make that determination.
159. United States Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 37 Pa. Commw. Ct.
173, 183-91, 390 A.2d 865, 870-73 (1978).
160. Id.
161. See notes 28-31 and accompanying text supra.
162. United States Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n 37, Pa. Commw. Ct.
173, 191, 390 A.2d 865, 873 (1978).
163. Id at 185-86, 390 A.2d at 871.
164. Id (emphasis added).
165. See generally United States Steel Corp. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 37 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 173, 390 A.2d 865 (1978).
In section 1304 of the Public Utility Code the legislature delegated to
the PUC the authority to determine whether rate structures are un-
reasonably discriminatory and prescribed the very broad standard of
reasonableness. 166  The recent decisions of the Pennsylvania
Supreme and Commonwealth Courts reveal that the courts are un-
willing to define further or restrict that standard.' 67 The PUC must,
therefore, be recognized as the source of this standard, with the
power to implement and justify any lifeline rate. Consequently, the
prospects for implementations of lifeline rates depend solely on the
PUC's willingness to embrace the policies inherent in such rate
structures.
Despite the potential for a standard that fluctuates with the
shifting political composition of the Commission, the PUC has con-
sistently utilized the traditional cost-of-service approach.1 68 The
sharp increases in the price of electricity in recent years and its im-
pact on the poor and elderly, however, have strained the commis-
sioners' acceptance of such a standard. 169 Motivated by the desire to
assist residential customers, the PUC implemented the low-usage
lifeline rate, but the PUC will grant such preferred rates only to the
extent that they can be justified on cost-of-service principles.
Hence, implementation of ability-to-pay rates is unlikely. The
PUC will continue to equate fairness in rate structure design with
rates that charge each customer class the cost to serve it. The limited
social compassion of the PUC will be expressed in the selective im-
plementation of the low-usage lifeline rate.
The PUC could alternatively adopt LRIC pricing theory as a
reasonable basis for rate structure design. The PUC has recognized
the broad range of economic and social benefits that result from
LRIC pricing and, therefore, recommends further investigation into
the practicability of LRIC rate structures. But until the PUC can be
convinced that an LRIC rate is workable and that a transition from a
cost-of-service to an LRIC rate structure can be effected with relative
ease, the Commission will continue to refuse to implement such
rates. Given the current paucity of supporting evidence, it is doubt-
ful that LRIC rate structures will be implemented in the near future.
ASHLEY C. SCHANNAUER
166. 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1304 (Purdon).
167. United States Steel Corp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 37 Pa. Commw Ct. 173, 390 A.2d
865 (1978), allocatur denied per curiam, Pa. Supreme Ct. Allocatur Docket Nos. 1749, 1752
(Dec. 14, 1978).
168. See notes 22-25 and accompanying text supra.
169. See notes 121-158 and accompanying text supra.
